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We analyze the effect of employer-sponsored health insurance premiums on employment
and annual wages in the US using a county-level panel dataset for the period 2005-2010.
Using variation in medical malpractice payments and variation in medical malpractice leg-
islation over time and within states as the source of identifying variation in the health
insurance premiums, we estimate the causal effects of rising health insurance premiums
on employment and annual wages. We find that a 10% increase in premiums reduces em-
ployment by 1.1 percentage points, and leads to a statistically insignificant reduction of
annual wages. Since US counties are characterized by a varying degree of private health
insurance coverage, we also test whether the private health insurance coverage is a mod-
erating variable for the relationship between the health insurance premiums and the labor
market outcomes analyzed in this study. We find that rising premiums negatively affect the
labor market conditions faced by US workers, especially in areas that are characterized by
high private health insurance coverage.
Keywords: Employer-sponsored health insurance premiums, Wages, Employment, Panel
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1 Introduction
The rate of growth in health care spending and the rate of growth in employer-sponsored health
insurance premiums in the United States have outpaced the inflation rate for many years. For ex-
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ample, Catlin and Cowan (2015) report that national health care spending increased at an annual
(nominal) rate of 5.4 per cent in the US during 2003-2013, and we find that employer-sponsored
health insurance premiums for single health insurance coverage increased at an annual (nom-
inal) rate of 5.7 per cent during 2003-2013 (see Kaiser/HRET (2013), Exhibit 1.11). Rapid
growth in employer-sponsored health insurance premiums may harm US workers in the form of
decreased employment and decreased wages. Since employer-sponsored health insurance cov-
erage constitutes a source of costs for employers, increases in the cost of employer-sponsored
health insurance may lead to lower employment and lower wages.
The impact of rising health insurance premiums for employer-sponsored health insurance
on employment and wages tends to depend on how much workers value the increase in the
health insurance costs paid by the employer. If workers fully value the health insurance ben-
efit provided by the employers, workers will accept wage reductions that are equivalent to the
increased employer spending on the health insurance benefit. That is, increases in the health
insurance premiums will be “fully shifted” onto wages,1 and employment levels will remain un-
varied. There are, however, three cases under which we may expect that increases in the health
insurance premiums will negatively affect employment. First, if rising premiums do not reflect
increases in the quantity or quality of the heath care provided by the employer but reflect health
care inflation, employees may not fully value increases in the cost of the employer-provided
health insurance benefit. In this case, workers will not accept wage reductions that are equiva-
lent to the increased cost of the health insurance benefit, and the final labor market equilibrium
might display lower employment. Second, the presence of labor unions is likely to restrict the
employer’s ability to reduce wages as a response to rising health insurance premiums. Thus, as
described in more detail below, the presence of labor unions may imply a detrimental effect of
rising premiums on employment. Third, employers may prefer to avoid wage reductions when
the health insurance premiums are rising, since wage reductions are likely to reduce working
morale as well as productivity and output (see, e.g., Kube et al. (2013)). Consequently, some
employers may prefer to reduce employment rather than cut wages when the health insurance
premiums are rising. Finally, it is worth noting that, in addition to the potential effects on em-
ployment and wages, rising premiums may also imply a decrease of employer-sponsored health
insurance coverage. Indeed, since employers provide health insurance coverage voluntarily in
the period under study (i.e., 2005-2010), employers may react to increases in the health insur-
ance premiums by dropping the health insurance coverage for their employees.
Reliable evidence on the economic impact of rapid growth in health insurance premiums
for employer-sponsored health insurance is crucial to inform policy debates. To date, however,
1 For example, Sheiner (1999) finds that increases in the cost of health insurance are fully shifted onto
wages for older workers. Since older workers are likely to become sick and are characterized by high
health care spending, older workers may fully value increases in the cost of the employer-sponsored
health insurance benefit.
90
CICCARELLI Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums, Employment and Wages
the available evidence is limited to studies that rely on repeated cross-sectional (and individual-
level) datasets, and that cannot account for all sources of time-invariant unobserved hetero-
geneity which are correlated with the health insurance premiums and the labor market out-
comes used in analysis (see, e.g., Cutler and Madrian (1998); Baicker and Chandra (2006)).
In contrast to previous studies, this paper uses a newly constructed panel dataset with data
on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums, employment, annual wages and private
(nonelderly) health insurance coverage, which is used as a proxy for employer-sponsored health
insurance coverage,2 to estimate the economic impact of rapid growth in employer-sponsored
health insurance premiums. All variables used in this study vary within counties and over time,
except the health insurance premiums which vary within states and over time. In addition to
controlling for all sources of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we identify the economic
impact of rising health insurance premiums by exploiting two plausibly exogenous sources of
(state-level) variation in the cost of providing health insurance: We use variation in medical
malpractice payments and variation in medical malpractice legislation to identify the effects
of rising premiums on employment, wages and private health insurance coverage. As will be
discussed below in more detail, increases in medical malpractice payments tend to increase the
cost of health care and the health insurance premiums by increasing medical malpractice in-
surance premiums. Variation in medical malpractice legislation such as the implementation of
medical malpractice tort reforms that limit doctors’ malpractice liability is likely to decrease the
employer-sponsored health insurance premiums by decreasing medical malpractice insurance
premiums.
Using the two sources of identification outlined above, and controlling for time-invariant
unobserved factors, we find that increases in the cost of health insurance imply a statistically
significant decrease of the employment rate. We find that a 10% increase in the health insur-
ance premiums implies a 1.1 percentage points decrease of the employment rate, ceteris paribus.
On the other hand, increases in the cost of health insurance imply an insignificant decrease of
annual wages. The previous results can be explained based on the following line of reason-
ing. Employees are not likely to fully value increases in the cost of health insurance that are
driven by increases in medical malpractice payments (or by variation in medical malpractice
legislation), since variation in medical malpractice payments (or variation in medical malprac-
tice legislation) shift the price of the health care provided by employers without enhancing
the quantity or quality of the same health care. Thus, increases in employer-sponsored health
insurance premiums will not be fully shifted onto wages, and rising premiums will decrease
employment. Since employer-sponsored health insurance premiums increased by 11.1% in real
terms between 2005 and 2010, our results indicate that the increasing cost of health insurance
had a strong negative effect on employment in the period 2005-2010.
2 See the following discussion about the accuracy of private health insurance coverage as a proxy for
employer-provided health insurance coverage.
91
Review of Economic Analysis 12 (2020) 89–127
Utilizing county-level estimates of private health insurance coverage as a proxy for employer-
sponsored health insurance coverage, we also analyzed whether the private health insurance
coverage acts as a moderating variable in the relationship between the health insurance premi-
ums and the labor market outcomes used in analysis. Indeed, since increases in the cost of health
insurance may negatively affect employment and wages via the increased cost of the health in-
surance benefit provided by the employer, rising premiums may imply stronger negative effects
on employment and wages in counties that are characterized by high private coverage. We in-
deed find that rising premiums imply a (statistically significantly) stronger negative impact on
employment and wages in counties with high private coverage. For example, we find that the
effect of the health insurance premiums is approximately 30% more negative on the employ-
ment rate and annual wages for the county at the 75th percentile of private coverage than for
the county at the 25th percentile of private coverage.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline a conceptual framework for
our analysis. In Section 3, we provide a literature review on the effects of employer-sponsored
health insurance premiums (or health care costs) on several labor market outcomes. Section 4
describes the data. The data sources for all variables used in this study are described in Ap-
pendix B. Section 5 describes the identification strategy used in this study. In Section 6 we
discuss the empirical results for the effects of the health insurance premiums on employment
and wages. Moreover, in the same section we analyze the effect of the health insurance premi-
ums on private health insurance coverage. In Section 7 we analyze whether the private heath
insurance coverage is a moderating variable for the relationship between the health insurance
premiums and the labor market outcomes used in analysis. Section 8 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we first outline a microeconomic model that is the basis for the analysis of
the effects of employer-sponsored health insurance premiums on employment and wages; the
microeconomic model is reported in Section 2.1. Second, in Section 2.2 we outline and discuss
some constraints on wage reductions that may have important implications on the effects of
rising premiums on employment and wages.
2.1 The Microeconomic Model
Gruber and Krueger (1991) developed a microeconomic model to analyze the effect of the intro-
duction of mandated employer-sponsored health insurance benefits on wages and employment.
Subsequently, Baicker and Chandra (2006) adapted the microeconomic model developed by
Gruber and Krueger (1991) to analyze the effect of increases in employer-sponsored health in-
surance premiums on wages and employment. In this section we briefly summarize the model
of Baicker and Chandra (2006), and we refer the reader to Baicker and Chandra (2006) for
further details.
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The effect of increased (employer-sponsored) health insurance premiums on wages and em-
ployment depends on several factors. Let Ld = fd(W + C) and Ls = fs(W + αC) be the labor
demand and labor supply curves, respectively. The variable W represents wages, C represents
the premium for the health insurance provided by the employer (which incorporates both the
quantity of insurance and the price of health insurance), αC represents the employees’ mone-
tary valuation of the health insurance benefit provided by the employer. Using this framework,
the effect of an increase in the health insurance premium (C) on wages is given by
dW
dC
= −η
d − αηs
ηd − ηs , (1)
where dC represents the change in the health insurance premium which is caused by an increase
in either the price or the quantity of the health insurance provided by the employer, and where
ηd and ηs are the price elasticities of labor demand and labor supply, respectively. Employment
may also be affected by a change in the health insurance premium; the effect of an increase (or
a decrease) in the health insurance premium on employment is given by eq. (2),
dL
L
= ηd
(W0 −W1 − dC)
W0
, (2)
where W0 and W1 represent the initial and final levels of wages, respectively.
If there are no constraints on wages and compensation packages, and if employees fully
value the health insurance benefit (α = 1), the microeconomic model outlined above predicts
that wages will decrease by the full cost of the increased health insurance premium (“full shift-
ing”), and employment levels will be unchanged. There are, however, other scenarios in which
the effect of an increase in the health insurance premium will not be fully absorbed by a de-
crease in the wage. First, employees may not fully value the health insurance benefit (α < 1),
or may simply assign no value to the health insurance benefit (α = 0). In these cases, the final
labor market equilibrium will be characterized by both lower employment and lower wages.3
Second, the employer’s ability to reduce wages when the health insurance premiums rise may
be constrained by some factors that are not taken into account in the above-mentioned model;
see Section 2.2 for more details.
2.2 Constraints on Wage Reductions
In Section 2.1 we assumed that employers are not limited in their ability to reduce wages when
the health insurance premiums rise. However, there are two cases under which the previous
assumption might be violated and under which we may expect that increases in the health
3 For simplicity, we exclude the scenario in which employees value the health insurance benefit more than
they value wages (α > 1). Since US employees can use wages to buy the heath insurance coverage on
their own via nongroup health insurance, it is unlikely that employees will value the employer-sponsored
health insurance benefit more than the wage –i.e., it is unlikely that α is larger than one.
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insurance premiums will not be fully absorbed by wage reductions. First, the presence of
labor unions may restrict the employer’s ability to reduce wages as a response to rising health
insurance premiums. Indeed, labor market contracts with unionized workers may preclude
wage cuts or even require wage increases, even if the cost of health insurance is rising (Sood
et al. (2009)); moreover, competition for workers that are employed by unionized firms may
further reduce the ability to absorb increases in the health insurance premiums via decreased
wages (Sood et al. (2009)). Even though the US union membership rate is fairly low in the
period 2005-2010 that is analyzed in this study (see, e.g., Western and Rosenfeld (2011)), the
existence of labor unions is likely to represent a constraint on the ability of employers to reduce
wages. Therefore, the existence of labor unions might imply that increases in the cost of the
health insurance benefit will negatively affect employment levels. Second, some employers
who face rising health insurance premiums may prefer not to reduce wages in order to avoid
damaging working morale (Sood et al. (2009)). Indeed, wage reductions may reduce working
morale as well as productivity and output (see, e.g., Kube et al. (2013)).4 In light of the previous
discussion, some employers may prefer to reduce employment (or to increase prices) rather than
cut wages when the health insurance premiums are rising.
3 Literature Review
In this section we summarize previous studies which analyzed the effects of employer-sponsored
health insurance premiums (or health care costs) on labor market outcomes that are related to
the labor market outcomes used in our analysis.
Cutler and Madrian (1998) study the effect of rising health insurance costs on hours worked
for the period 1979-1992. The authors use data on (per-worker) spending on health insurance
for each US industry, and individual-level data on hours worked from the CPS (Current Pop-
ulation Survey). Using a pooled OLS regression model and assigning health insurance costs
to employees based on their industry, the authors find that rising health insurance costs in the
1980s increased the hours worked of employees that are covered by employer-provided health
insurance by 3 percent. Since the health insurance benefit is a fixed cost for employers at any
fixed point in time, firms face an incentive to substitute hours per worker for employment when
the health insurance costs rise.
Baicker and Chandra (2006) analyze the effect of rising health insurance premiums on
wages, employment and other labor market outcomes for the period 1996-2002. The authors
use state-level data on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums from the Medical Ex-
penditure Panel Survey, and individual-level data on labor market outcomes from the CPS.
Using a pooled OLS regression model with state fixed effects, and using instrumental variables
4 Via a natural field experiment, Kube et al. (2013) show that wage reductions have a detrimental and
persistent impact on productivity and firm output. Furthermore, the authors interpret the aforementioned
effects as evidence that wage cuts damage working morale (see p. 11 of Kube et al. (2013)).
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for the health insurance premiums, the authors find a substantial negative effect of rising health
insurance premiums on employment and wages. Indeed, a 10% increase in the health insurance
premiums reduces the probability of being employed by 1.2 percentage points, and implies a
2.3% decrease of wages for employees that are covered by employer-provided health insurance
–i.e., rising premiums are fully shifted onto wages for these employees. On the other hand,
rising premiums do not have a significant effect on wages for the full sample of respondents
included in the CPS (see Table 2 of Baicker and Chandra (2006)). Finally, it is worth noting
that increases in the cost of health insurance do not imply a decrease of employer-sponsored
health insurance coverage for the full sample of individuals included in the CPS.
Sood et al. (2009) analyze the effect of rising health care costs on employment, gross output
and value added of US industries for the period 1987-2005. The authors use data on health care
costs for each US industry from the National Health Expenditures Accounts (NHEA) database,
and use data on employment, gross output and value added for each US industry from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Annual Industry Accounts database. The authors find substantial
negative effects of rising health care costs on industry-level employment, gross output and value
added, and these effects are stronger for industries in which large percentages of workers receive
employer-provided health insurance.
4 Data
We use a panel of annual variables for counties in the 50 US states plus the District of Columbia.
All variables used in this study vary at the county-year level, except the employer-sponsored
health insurance premiums which vary at the state-year level. County-level estimates on employer-
sponsored health insurance premiums are not available from governmental agencies, and we use
state-level estimates for employer-sponsored health insurance premiums from the MEPS-IC
database (see discussion below for more details). We focus our analysis on data for the pe-
riod 2005-2010, since county-level estimates for private (nonelderly) health insurance coverage
cannot be computed for the years before 2005 and the years after 2010.5
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums
We use annual state-level data on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums from the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component for the period 2005-2010. The main
explanatory variable used in this study is the state-level average of annual health insurance
premiums for single (health insurance) coverage.6 Data on health insurance premiums for the
5 See the discussion below and Appendix B.3 for more details on data restrictions for private health
insurance coverage. Moreover, data on control variables from the U.S. Census Bureau’s “USA Counties”
database are missing for the years after 2010, since the U.S. Census Bureau has terminated its support
for the “USA Counties” database in 2010.
6 Annual health insurance premiums for single coverage are the sum of the employee and employer con-
tributions for single coverage. Employer contributions for health insurance amounted to approximately
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year 2007 are missing for all US states. As in Burtless and Mikusheva (2012), data for the health
insurance premiums in year 2007 are imputed as the average of the health insurance premiums
in year 2006 and year 2008 (by state).
Since we use state-level estimates of health insurance premiums as a proxy for the (un-
known) county-level premiums, our main explanatory variable is very likely to be measured
with error; more details on the problem of measurement error in the health insurance premiums
are provided in Section 5. Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI inflation calculator, we
express the health insurance premiums in constant 2005 US dollars, and we additionally ex-
press the health insurance premiums in 1,000 US dollars. As shown in Panel A of Table 1, the
average of the (real) health insurance premiums expressed in 1,000 US dollars is 4.040, that is,
premiums for single coverage averaged 4,040 US dollars in the period 2005-2010. The health
insurance premiums display high variability as they range between a minimum value of 3,384
US dollars and a maximum value of 5,505 US dollars in the period 2005-2010 (see Table 1).
Moreover, the health insurance premiums are characterized by high variability over time. In-
deed, as shown in the first row of Table 2, the yearly average of the health insurance premiums
varies considerably over time and grows between 2006 and 2010. Lastly, in Appendix B.1 we
report more details about the data sources and the data imputation technique that is used for the
health insurance premiums.
Labor Market Outcomes
The labor market outcomes used in this study are the employment rate and annual wages. These
two variables are used as they naturally arise from the microeconomic model reported in Section
2.1. Both the employment rate and annual wages vary within counties and over time.
The employment rate is constructed as the ratio between the number of employed persons
and the number of 15-64 year old persons (by county). Data on the number of employed persons
for each county is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ QCEW (Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages) dataset. Data on the number of 15-64 year old persons living in each
county is obtained from the US Census Bureau’s “USA Counties” dataset. The QCEW dataset
does not include self-employed workers in the number of employed persons (see also Retzer et
al. (2013), p. 169), thus the average of the employment rate used in this study is lower than the
average of the employment rate found in official statistics for the United States. The average of
the employment rate is 0.51 (see Panel A of Table 1). The yearly averages of the employment
rate display considerable variability over time, since they range between a minimum value of
0.50 in the year 2010 to a maximum value of 0.53 in the year 2007 (see Table 2).
County-level estimates of annual wages are obtained from the QCEW dataset. In the QCEW
dataset, annual wages are computed as the ratio between total annual wages and total annual
87% of the total premium for single coverage in the period 1999-2008 (see Claxton et al. (2007), p.
1410). The relative shares of the total premium paid by employers and employees remained approxi-
mately constant in the period 1999-2008 (Claxton et al. (2008), Exhibit 6.1, p. 70).
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employment (by county). Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI inflation calculator, we
express annual wages in constant 2005 US dollars. The average of annual wages is close to
29,800 US dollars in real terms in the period 2005-2010 (see Panel A of Table 1). The yearly
averages of the annual wages exhibit limited variability over time, and they range between
29,229 US dollars and 29,975 US dollars. Finally, in Appendix B.2 we report more details
about the data sources for the employment rate and annual wages.
Private (Nonelderly) Health Insurance Coverage
County-level estimates of employer-sponsored health insurance coverage are not available from
US governmental agencies. For this reason we use county-level estimates of private nonelderly
health insurance coverage as a proxy for (county-level) employer-sponsored health insurance
coverage. Our estimates for private nonelderly health insurance coverage are obtained using
data from the US Census Bureau’s SAHIE (Small Area Health Insurance Estimates) dataset
and the US Department of Health & Human Services’ AHRF (Area Health Resource File)
dataset. In Appendix A.2 we explain in detail how we constructed the county-level estimates
for private nonelderly health insurance coverage.
Our county-level estimates for private health insurance (PHI) coverage represent the
county-level share of nonelderly (0-64) individuals that are covered by either employer-sponsored
health insurance (ESHI) or nongroup health insurance (NHI). Even though our estimates
for the PHI coverage are not identical to the ESHI coverage by definition, it is worth mentioning
that the vast majority of privately insured individuals are covered by ESHI in the United States.
Indeed, DeNavas-Walt et al. (2008) report that approximately 88% of US individuals covered
by PHI are covered by ESHI while only 12% of US individuals covered by PHI are covered by
NHI.
For two reasons which are discussed below in detail, it is highly likely that our county-level
estimates of PHI coverage are a relatively accurate proxy of county-level ESHI coverage. First,
Blavin et al. (2012) reports that NHI coverage remained relatively constant in the period 2000-
2010.7 Since the identification strategy used in this paper accounts for county fixed effects,
and based on the above-mentioned finding reported in Blavin et al. (2012), it is highly likely
that changes in PHI coverage over time are primarily driven by changes in ESHI coverage over
time. Second, using data from March CPS datasets for the period 2006-2011, we computed
estimates of state-level ESHI coverage for the years 2005 to 2010 (see Appendix B.4 for more
details about these estimates), and we have found that the correlation between our county-level
estimates of PHI coverage and the state-level estimates of ESHI coverage from the March CPS
7 Blavin et al. (2012), p.4: “Figures 1 through 4 show trends between 2000 and 2010 in ESI [employer-
sponsored insurance], Medicaid, and uninsurance among parents, adults without dependent children,
and children. Rates of nongroup and other public coverage were relatively constant over the period of
analysis and are therefore not included in any of the figures.”
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datasets ranges between 0.55 and 0.82.8 The latter result seems to suggest that our county-
level estimates of PHI coverage are a relatively accurate proxy for the (unknown) county-level
ESHI coverage. As shown in Panel A of Table 1, the average of PHI coverage is 0.621, that
is, approximately 62.1% of nonelderly US individuals are covered by PHI in the period 2005-
2010.9 Finally, the average of the PHI coverage decreases from a value of 0.63 in the year 2005
to a value of 0.60 in the year 2010 (see Table 2).
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Health Insurance Premiums, Labor Market Outcomes
and Private Health Insurance Coverage
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Health insurance premiums in 1,000 US $† 15366 4.040 0.300 3.384 5.505
Employment rate†† 15366 0.514 0.204 0.233 0.886
Annual wages in US dollars§ 15366 29781.62 6645.618 19844.16 53023.25
Private health insurance coverage (share) 15366 0.621 0.117 0.391 0.811
†The health insurance premiums are expressed in real terms: We discount the nominal health insurance
premiums back to the year 2005 using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI inflation calculator, and we
express the health insurance premiums in 1,000 US dollars.
††The employment rate is constructed as the ratio between the number of employed persons (QCEW
dataset) and the number of 15-64 year old persons (“USA counties” dataset).
§Annual wages are expressed in real terms: we discount nominal wages back to the year 2005 using the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI inflation calculator.
8 First, we computed the correlation between the county-level PHI coverage and the state-level ESHI
coverage from the March CPS, and we have found that the correlation is 0.55. Second, since the ESHI
coverage estimates from the March CPS vary at the state (and year) level while our estimates for the
county-level PHI coverage vary at the county (and year) level, we averaged the PHI coverage at the
state-year level, and we computed the correlation between the latter variable and the state-level ESHI
coverage from the March CPS. In this case, we have found that the correlation is 0.82.
9 Summary statistics for total and public (nonelderly) health insurance coverage are reported in Table C1.
Around 82% of nonelderly individuals are covered by any form of health insurance in the period 2005-
2010, and around 20% of nonelderly individuals are covered by public health insurance (i.e., Medicaid,
Children’s Health Insurance Program) in the period 2005-2010.
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Control Variables
We control for an extensive set of variables that may be correlated to the labor market outcomes
and the health insurance premiums. All control variables used in this study vary at the county-
year level. We report panel-level summary statistics for the control variables in Table 3, and we
report the yearly averages and yearly standard deviations for the control variables in Table 2.
We control for several socio-economic variables. Data on socio-economic variables are
obtained from the US Census Bureau’s “USA counties” data set (see Appendix B.5 for more
details). Socio-economic control variables include: (1) share of males; (2) three variables for
the age distribution (i.e., share of 15-19 year old persons, share of 20-24 year old persons, share
of 65+ year old persons); (3) population density (i.e., population per square mile); (4) eight
variables for the racial composition of the county population. Individuals can be White, Black,
Asian, of another race; moreover, individuals of any race can be either (I) Hispanic, or (II)
non-Hispanic. We control for eight variables indicating the county-level share of individuals
belonging to a specific combination of race and Hispanic origin; the baseline variable is the
share of non-Hispanic Whites.
We control for an additional variable that in this study is defined as share of small firms.
This variable is the ratio between the number of small firms and total number of firms (by
county). In line with the classification of firm size used in the US, firms that employ less than
500 employees are defined as small firms for the construction of the variable share of small
firms. Since small (big) firms have low (high) bargaining power in extracting price concessions
from health insurers (Stevens (2003), p. 74), it is likely that the share of small firms is correlated
with the health insurance premiums (see also Lee (2002)). Lastly, the data sources that are used
to construct share of small firms are reported in Appendix B.1.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Control Variables
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Male (share) 15366 0.499 0.022 0.426 0.721
Age distribution:
Age (15-19) (share) 15366 0.072 0.011 0.022 0.157
Age (20-24) (share) 15366 0.062 0.025 0.013 0.283
Age (65+) (share) 15366 0.154 0.041 0.029 0.434
Population density (pop. per square mile) 15366 235.939 1702.654 0.038 69559
Race/Hispanic origin variables:
White non-Hispanic (share) 15366 0.791 0.196 0.025 0.994
White Hispanic (share) 15366 0.072 0.125 0 0.959
Black non-Hispanic (share) 15366 0.087 0.143 0 0.859
Black Hispanic (share) 15366 0.002 0.004 0 0.133
Asian non-Hispanic (share) 15366 0.011 0.023 0 0.440
Asian Hispanic (share) 15366 0.0005 0.001 0 0.015
Other non-Hispanic (share) 15366 0.032 0.081 0 0.970
Other Hispanic (share) 15366 0.005 0.006 0 0.070
Share of small firms 15366 0.915 0.036 0.531 1
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Panel Structure
The longitudinal dataset used in this study is almost balanced, and we use 15,366 observations
in analysis. For each year, our longitudinal dataset contains data on slightly more than 3,040
counties (see Table A1). This represents almost 97% of the total number of US counties, since
the total number of US counties is 3,142 in the period under study.
5 Empirical Strategy
We start this section by providing details on the estimation methodology used in analysis; see
Section 5.1. In Section 5.2 we provide details on the main identification strategy used in analy-
sis.
5.1 Methodology
As reported in Section 4, all dependent and explanatory variables used in this study vary at
the county-year level, except the health insurance premiums which vary at the state-year level.
Consider the following regression model for county c (and state s) in year t:
yct = β1 premiumsst + controls>ctβ2 + Tt + vct, where vct = αc + ct. (3)
Here, yct is the labor market outcome of interest (employment rate or annual wages) or pri-
vate health insurance coverage. The expression premiumsst represents the health insurance
premiums in state s and year t. The expression controlsct measures county-level covariates,
including socio-economic controls and share of small firms. The expression Tt represents year
fixed effects, and vct is a composite error term which is composed by time-invariant county-level
unobserved heterogeneity (αc) and a county-specific idiosyncratic error (ct).
As a first step, we use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) to study the association be-
tween the health insurance premiums and the dependent variables. In the case of pooled OLS
estimation, time-invariant county-level unobserved heterogeneity (αc) is treated as part of the
error term, and is not eliminated from the regression model – i.e., the error term is the com-
posite error term (vct). Since the error term in eq. (3) may be heteroskedastic and clustered,
we use cluster-robust standard errors; the standard errors are clustered at the state level since
our main explanatory variable -i.e., the health insurance premiums- varies at the state level. As
time-invariant and unobserved county characteristics might be correlated with the dependent
variable and the health insurance premiums, the OLS estimates cannot be interpreted as causal.
Time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity can be eliminated from the regression model (3)
using within-group transformation or first-difference transformation of the longitudinal dataset.
We use the latter estimation methodology, since in this case we can use both “external instru-
mental variables” and “internal instrumental variables” for the endogenous variables: External
instrumental variables are represented by random variables that do not arise from the regression
model (3) while internal instrumental variables arise from the regression model itself in the
101
Review of Economic Analysis 12 (2020) 89–127
form of lagged explanatory variables (see, e.g., p. 372 of Wooldridge (2010)).10 The panel data
model in first differences for county c (and state s) in year t takes the following form:
∆yct = β1∆premiumsst + ∆controls>ctβ2 + ∆Tt + ∆ct, (4)
and the FD (first difference) estimator is the OLS estimator applied to equation (4). Since the
error term in eq. (4) may be heteroskedastic and clustered, we use cluster-robust standard errors,
and the standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Since the estimate of the main parameter of interest (β1) may be biased due to endogeneity
problems (e.g., measurement errors in the health insurance premiums), we will also analyze the
effect of the health insurance premiums on the dependent variables using instrumental variables
for the health insurance premiums; see Section 5.2 for more details.
5.2 Identification Strategy
Measurement errors in the health insurance premiums may introduce a bias toward zero in the
estimated coefficient on the premiums. The true (and unknown) county-level premiums are the
sum of the state-level premiums and an error term which varies at the county level:
premiumsct = premiumsst + mct, (5)
where s indicates the state, c indicates the county, and t indicates the year. Here, mct represents
an error term that is idiosyncratic to county c in year t. Since our preferred identification strategy
relies on first difference estimation (see above), eq. (5) can be replaced by eq. (6),
∆premiumsct = ∆premiumsst + ∆mct, (6)
where ∆mct denotes the measurement error in first differences. If measurement error in levels
(mct) is a unit root process – i.e., mct = mc,t−1 + ξct where ξct is a white noise process – then
measurement errors in the health insurance premiums would not lead to a bias toward zero
in the estimated coefficient on the premiums. Excluding the above case, there are, however,
several cases in which measurement error bias may arise, even in the case that we estimate the
parameters of interest using the regression model in first differences (4). Thus, for simplicity
we assume that measurement errors are likely to affect our empirical results – i.e., we do not
assume that Cov(∆ct,∆mct) = 0.
In the case that the dependent variable is either annual wages or the employment rate, an
additional source of endogeneity may be reverse causality bias. In the case of annual wages,
10 Internal instrumental variables require an additional validity assumption compared to external instru-
mental variables: The error term in levels (ct) must be serially uncorrelated. For this reason, we use
internal instruments only in the case that external instruments are jointly weak in the first-stage regres-
sion. Internal instruments are used exclusively in Section 7. See Section 7 for more details about internal
instruments.
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reverse causality bias may be present for the following reason. Since increases in income or
wages imply rising health care spending (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2013)), and since premiums
depend positively on health care spending,11 we believe that increases in annual wages are
likely to increase the health insurance premiums. Second, following the same line of reasoning
reported above, increases in (local) employment rates are likely to increase the health insurance
premiums by increasing (local) average income.
A solution to the problem of endogeneity bias is to instrument for the health insurance
premiums using variables that are uncorrelated with ∆ct and ∆mct but are correlated with the
health insurance premiums. In our analysis we use per capita medical malpractice payments
and variation in medical malpractice legislation within states and over time to generate exter-
nal instrumental variables for the health insurance premiums. In the following discussion, we
describe the external instrumental variables and we explore the exogeneity of the external in-
strumental variables. Moreover, we report and discuss the first-stage estimates for the effects of
the instrumental variables on the health insurance premiums.
The External Instrumental Variables and the First-Stage Estimates
Variation in Medical Malpractice Legislation
Medical malpractice tort reforms tend to decrease medical malpractice payments by limiting
doctors’ medical malpractice liability. Indeed, medical malpractice tort reforms usually set caps
on the awards that the victim of malpractice can obtain from the negligent doctor (see Table A3
for an example of tort reform). Moreover, and more importantly, Kessler and McClellan (1996)
show that medical malpractice tort reforms decrease the likelihood that doctors practice “defen-
sive medicine” – i.e., to perform excessive tests and procedures because of concerns about mal-
practice liability. Since the demand for health care is relatively inelastic (Baicker and Chandra
(2005)), the decreased costs of medical malpractice, which are caused by the implementation of
malpractice tort reforms, will be passed along to consumers of health care in the form of lower
health care prices and lower health insurance premiums (Baicker and Chandra (2006)). In line
with this theoretical argument, Avraham et al. (2012) find that the implementation of medical
malpractice tort reforms reduces employer-sponsored health insurance premiums.
Several states enacted a cap on non-economic damage awards since 2005 (see Table A4).12
Non-economic damage awards are awards that the victim of malpractice can obtain from the
negligent doctor for pain and suffering caused by the negligent doctor. Based on the previous
discussion, states that enacted caps on non-economic damage awards may have experienced
a decrease of employer-sponsored health insurance premiums. We construct an instrumental
variable for the health insurance premiums using the introduction of caps on non-economic
11 Indeed, health insurers set the health insurance premiums equal to health care spending plus a markup
over costs.
12 See Appendix B.6 for details on data sources for medical malpractice tort reforms.
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damage awards. First, we generated a dummy variable (caps on damagesst) which is equal to
1 for state s in the year of the reform and in successive years, 0 otherwise. For instance, as
reported in Table A4, caps on damagesst takes the value of 0 for the state of Alaska in 2005,
and caps on damagesst takes the value of 1 for the state of Alaska in 2006-2010 since a cap on
non-economic damage awards was introduced in Alaska in the year 2006. Second, since health
insurance contracts are typically finalized 3+ months prior to the calendar year in which they
take effect (Avraham et al. (2012), p. 13), the final instrumental variable takes a value of 1 in
the year following the implementation of the tort reform (and successive years). That is, we
use caps on damagess,t−1 as the instrumental variable for the health insurance premiums (see
Avraham et al. (2012) for a similar specification).
Medical malpractice tort laws can also be repealed by state supreme courts if a medical
malpractice tort law is incompatible with the state or federal constitution, or with state or federal
laws. Following the same line of reasoning reported above, repeals of caps on non-economic
damage awards may lead to higher health insurance premiums. We constructed an additional
instrumental variable for the health insurance premiums using repeals of caps on non-economic
damage awards; information about repeals of caps on non-economic damage awards is provided
in the second row of Table A4. We use repealss,t−1 as the instrumental variable for the health
insurance premiums, where repealss,t−1 takes a value of 1 in the year following the repeal of
the tort reform (and successive years). In line with the theoretical arguments reported above,
we find that enactments of caps on non-economic damages are negatively (but insignificantly)
correlated to the health insurance premiums, and we find that repeals of caps on non-economic
damage awards are positively and significantly correlated to the health insurance premiums at
the 5% significance level; see the regression results in Table D1.13 Finally, we find that repeals
of caps on non-economic damage awards lead to a 2.7% statistically significant increase of the
health insurance premiums.
The passage of tort reforms is a political process whose outcome depends on political and
ideological factors that are unlikely to be related to the labor market outcomes used in anal-
ysis. The main opposition to the implementation of tort reforms, such as the implementation
of caps on non-economic damage awards, is based on the argument that doctors will operate
less carefully after the implementation of tort reforms. Moreover, states that enact tort reforms
may attract the riskiest doctors from other US states (see, e.g., Seabury (2009)). Political and
ideological factors that are unrelated to the labor market outcomes used in our analysis are
the primary factors that determined the timing of the implementation of caps on non-economic
damage awards. Moreover, supreme courts’ decisions about the repeal of caps on non-economic
damage awards are unlikely to be affected by present or past trends in employment or wages,
13 The regression results reported in Table D1 are the estimates of equation (4), with the health insurance
premiums on the left hand side of equation (4), and with caps on damagess,t−1 and repealss,t−1 on the
right hand side of equation (4).
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and are likely to be related to innovations in the (state or federal) law environment. Conse-
quently, we believe that the instrumental variables reported above are unlikely to be correlated
with the error term on the labor market outcomes used in analysis.
Per Capita Medical Malpractice Payments
An external instrumental variable that is used in this study is per capita medical malpractice
payments. Per capita medical malpractice payments are likely to significantly affect the health
insurance premiums for the following reasons. Rising medical malpractice payments imply an
increase of medical malpractice insurance premiums; since the demand for health services is
relatively inelastic (Baicker and Chandra (2005)), rising medical malpractice insurance premi-
ums will be passed along to consumers of health care in the form of higher health care prices
and higher health insurance premiums (Baicker and Chandra (2006)).
The usage of (state-level) per capita medical malpractice payments as an instrument for the
health insurance premiums is likely to remove the bias from any residual correlation between the
health insurance premiums (∆premiumsst) and the error term of the structural equation (∆ct).
Indeed, the instrument (∆paymentsst) only picks up that part of the within-state variation in
premiums that is caused by changes in the state malpractice environment. Thus, it is likely
that variation in medical malpractice payments over time (∆paymentsst) are uncorrelated to the
error term of the structural equation.
The data for per capita medical malpractice payments are obtained from the National Prac-
titioner Data Bank (NPDB) for the period 2005-2010 (see Appendix B.6 for more details on
data sources for malpractice payments). Per capita medical malpractice payments are the ra-
tio between total malpractice payments in each US state and the state population. Moreover,
we express per capita medical malpractice payments in real terms (constant 2005 US dollars).
Summary statistics for medical malpractice payments are reported in Table A2. The average of
per capita medical malpractice payments is close to 10 US dollars in the period 2005-2010.
First-stage Estimates
Our preferred instrumental variable for the health insurance premiums is per capita medical
malpractice payments, since per capita medical malpractice payments vary over time and within
states for all US states, while the remaining instrumental variables affect only few US states in
the period 2005-2010. The instrumental variables which are based on variation in medical
malpractice legislation are used in order to improve the first-stage model fit and test the over-
identifying restrictions. Thus, in the following discussion we will report first-stage estimates for
the effects of the instruments on the health insurance premiums using two sets of instrumental
variables: (a) per capita medical malpractice payments (alone); (b) all three instrumental vari-
ables described above. First stage estimates using per capita medical malpractice payments as
the exclusive instrumental variable are shown in column 1 of Table 4 while first stage estimates
using all three instrumental variables are shown in column 2 of Table 4.
105
Review of Economic Analysis 12 (2020) 89–127
Table 4: First-stage FDIV Estimates
(1) (2)
FDIV (first-stage) FDIV (first-stage)
Dependent variable
HI Premium (in 1,000 $) HI Premium (in 1,000 $)
Medical malpractice payments 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.0038) (0.0038)
Caps on damages (enactments) - 0.015
- (0.048)
Caps on damages (repeals) - 0.125***
- (0.016)
F-statistic on the excluded instrument(s)‡ 7.966 21.485
P-value 0.0069 0.0000
Observations 15,366 15,366
Adjusted R-squared 0.399 0.401
Year fixed effects? YES YES
County fixed effects?† YES YES
Controls?†† ALL ALL
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Clustered (and robust) standard errors at the state level
are reported in parenthesis. The outcome variable is health insurance premiums. Year FE (fixed effects)
are included in the regression model. The first-stage (FDIV) estimates are obtained using the StataTM
command “ivreg2, cluster(state identifier)” using the model in first differences.
‡The F-statistic on the excluded instrument(s) is the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic. The
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic takes into account the usage of cluster-robust standard errors.
†County FE (fixed effects) are eliminated from the regression model using first-difference transformation
of the regression model.
††Control variables include eight variables for race and Hispanic origin, share of males, three variables
for the population distribution by age, population density, share of small firms.
In the case that we exclusively use per capita medical malpractice payments to instrument
for the health insurance premiums (see column 1 of Table 4), we find that per capita medi-
cal malpractice payments are significantly correlated to the health insurance premiums at the
5% significance level. The first-stage estimate reported in column 1 of Table 4 suggests that
when medical malpractice payments double, health insurance premiums increase by 2.7%. It
is worthwhile noting that the latter result is quite similar to the effect of per capita medical
malpractice payments on health insurance premiums found by Baicker and Chandra (2006), as
the latter authors have found that a 100% increase of medical malpractice payments leads to a
1%-2% increase of the health insurance premiums (see pp. 622-624 of Baicker and Chandra
(2006)).
As shown in column 1 of Table 4, we find that the first-stage F-statistic is 7.966 in the
case that we exclusively use per capita medical malpractice payments to instrument for the
health insurance premiums. On the contrary, the first-stage F-statistic is larger than 10 (F-
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statistic=21.485) in the case that we use all available instruments (see column 2 of Table 4),
indicating that the instrumental variables are jointly strong to predict the health insurance pre-
miums in the first-stage regression. Since the first-stage F-statistic is lower than 10 when we
exclusively use per capita medical malpractice payments to instrument for the health insurance
premiums, we also estimated LIML (limited information maximum likelihood) models, using
per capita medical malpractice payments as the exclusive instrument for the health insurance
premiums. The second-stage results from LIML models were approximately identical to the
second-stage results from standard TSLS (two-stage least squares) models. Since LIML esti-
mation is more reliable than TSLS estimation when the instrumental variable is weak (see Stock
et al. (2002)), it is very likely that the second-stage estimates (based on medical malpractice pay-
ments as the exclusive instrumental variable) are not attributable to the weak instrumentation
problem.
6 Empirical Results
In this section we analyze the effects of the health insurance premiums on the labor market
outcomes and private health insurance coverage. We start this section by discussing the effects
on labor market outcomes in Section 6.1. Since increases in the health insurance premiums
may lead to a decline of private health insurance coverage, we report and discuss estimates for
the effect of the health insurance premiums on private health insurance coverage in Section 6.2.
Lastly, in Section 6.3 we explore the robustness of our identification strategy.
6.1 The Causal Effects of the Health Insurance Premiums on Employment and
Wages
We begin with an examination of the effect of increases in the health insurance premiums on the
employment rate. Column 1 of Table 5 shows the results of the OLS estimation of equation
(3). This regression includes year fixed effects but does not account for county fixed effects.
We find that premiums are not significantly correlated with the employment rate, and the co-
efficient on premiums is positive. The OLS estimate cannot be interpreted as causal, since the
health insurance premiums and the employment rate may be correlated with unobserved county
characteristics that do not vary over time.14
Once we additionally control for time-invariant unobserved county characteristics using the
FD estimator (see eq. (4)), we find that increases in the health insurance premiums lead to
a significant decrease of the employment rate at the 5% significance level (see column 2 of
14 Since a direct comparison of pooled OLS and FD (first differences) estimates cannot be implemented,
we compared RE (random effects) and FE (fixed effects) estimates via the Hausman test, and we have
found that RE and FE estimates are systematically different. Thus, time-invariant county characteristics
seem to be correlated with the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. In turn, this implies
that the results from the pooled OLS estimator are unreliable. RE and FE estimates are not reported and
are available from the author.
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Table 5). This estimate suggests that a 10% increase in premiums implies a 0.5% decrease (0.2-
percentage-points decrease) of the employment rate. However, this estimate may be biased due
to endogeneity problems. First, the FD estimate may be biased toward zero due to measurement
errors in the health insurance premiums. Second, reverse causality may lead to an upward bias
in the coefficient on the health insurance premiums. As a matter of fact, increases in local
employment rates are very likely to imply increases in local incomes, which in turn are likely
to increase health care spending15 and the health insurance premiums (see also Section 5.2).
Since the health insurance premiums may be endogenous with respect to the error term on
the employment rate, we also used instrumental variables to account for the potential endogene-
ity of premiums. We start by using per capita medical malpractice payments as the exclusive
instrument for the health insurance premiums; see column 1 of Table 4 for the first-stage regres-
sion estimate. Second-stage estimates from the first difference instrumental variables (FDIV)
estimator are shown in column 3 of Table 5. Even though the null hypothesis of exogeneity of
the health insurance premiums is not rejected at the 5% level (Hausman test’s p-value=0.11),
the second-stage FDIV estimate is relevantly more negative than the corresponding FD esti-
mate. The latter result may be explained by either measurement errors in premiums or reverse
causation or both endogeneity problems. The second-stage coefficient for the health insur-
ance premiums is statistically significant at the 5% significance level, and indicates that a 10%
increase in premiums leads to a 2.2% decrease (1.1-percentage-points decrease) of the employ-
ment rate. We can use our estimates to study the economy-wide impact of the growth of health
insurance premiums in the period 2005-2010. Since premiums increased by 11.1% in real terms
between 2005 and 2010 (see Table 2), rising premiums decreased the employment rate by 2.4%
(1.2-percentage-points) in the period 2005-2010, ceteris paribus.
We also report and discuss the second-stage FDIV estimate in the case that we use the full
set of instruments for the health insurance premiums (see Section 5.2 for the list of instrumental
variables for the health insurance premiums). The first-stage FDIV estimates are reported in
column 2 of Table 4 while the second-stage FDIV estimate is reported in column 4 of Table
5. The second-stage coefficient on the health insurance premiums using the full set of instru-
ments is approximately identical to the coefficient reported in column 3 of Table 5, in which
case we used per capita medical malpractice payments as the only excluded instrument. For this
reason we do not describe the empirical results from FDIV estimation which uses all available
instruments for the health insurance premiums, and we refer the reader to the discussion re-
ported above in which case we exclusively used per capita medical malpractice payments as the
unique excluded instrumental variable. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the over-identifying
restrictions are not rejected at the 5% level (Hansen test’s p-value=0.58), indicating that the
instruments are very likely to be exogenous.
15 E.g., see Acemoglu et al. (2013).
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Table 5: The Effects of the Health Insurance Premiums on Employment – OLS, FD and
Second-stage FDIV Estimates Using Two Sets of Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FD FDIV FDIV
(second-stage) (second-stage)
Dependent variable: employment rate
HI Premium (in 1000 $) 0.049 -0.006*** -0.028** -0.029**
(0.042) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366
Adjusted R-squared 0.170 0.113 - -
Year fixed effects? YES YES YES YES
County fixed effects?† NO YES YES YES
Controls?†† ALL ALL ALL ALL
Additional tests for FDIV estimations
F-statistic on excluded
instrument(s)‡
- - 7.966 21.485
Hausman test’s p-value§ - - 0.113 0.063
Hansen J test’s p-value§ - - - 0.580
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Clustered (and robust) standard errors at the state level
are reported in parenthesis. The outcome variable is the employment rate in Columns 1-4. Year FE
(fixed effects) are included in the regression model. The second-stage (FDIV) estimates are computed
using the StataTM command “ivreg2, cluster(state identifier)” using the model in first differences.
‡The F-statistic on the excluded instrument(s) is the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic. The
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic takes into account the usage of cluster-robust standard errors.
†County FE (fixed effects) are eliminated from the regression models using first-difference
transformation of the regression model, except in the case of Column 1 (pooled OLS estimation).
††Control variables include eight variables for race and Hispanic origin, share of males, three variables
for the population distribution by age, population density, share of small firms.
§The Hausman test and the Hansen J test are used to test the exogeneity of the health insurance
premiums and the validity of the over-identifying restrictions, respectively. Under the null hypothesis of
the Hausman test, the premiums are exogenous. Under the null hypothesis of the Hansen J test, the
over-identifying restrictions are valid.
We also investigated the effect of the health insurance premiums on annual wages. We
report the OLS estimate for the effect of the health insurance premiums on annual wages in
column 1 of Table 6. Based on this estimate, we note that premiums are positively correlated
with wages at the 5% significance level: Counties with highly productive workers earning high
wages are likely to be characterized by high health care spending and high health insurance
premiums (Baicker and Chandra (2006), p. 616). Controlling for time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity via the FD estimator reverses the sign of the coefficient on the health insurance
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premiums, and makes the coefficient statistically insignificant (see column 2 of Table 6). In
unreported regressions, we have found evidence that time-invariant county characteristics are
correlated with annual wages and the explanatory variables,14 making the OLS estimate unreli-
able.
Table 6: The Effects of the Health Insurance Premiums on Annual Wages – OLS, FD and
Second-stage FDIV Estimates Using Two Sets of Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FD FDIV FDIV
(second-stage) (second-stage)
Dependent variable: annual wages
HI Premium (in 1000 $) 4,424.718*** -165.911 -250.269 -353.025
(919.221) (111.927) (727.216) (711.050)
Observations 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366
Adjusted R-squared 0.429 0.068 - -
Year fixed effects? YES YES YES YES
County fixed effects?† NO YES YES YES
Controls?†† ALL ALL ALL ALL
Additional tests for FDIV estimations
F-statistic on excluded
instrument(s)‡
- - 7.966 21.485
Hausman test’s p-value§ - - 0.906 0.760
Hansen J test’s p-value§ - - - 0.489
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Clustered (and robust) standard errors at the state level
are reported in parenthesis. The outcome variable is annual wages in Columns 1-4. Year FE (fixed
effects) are included in the regression model. The second-stage (FDIV) estimates are computed using the
StataTM command “ivreg2, cluster(state identifier)” using the model in first differences.
‡The F-statistic on the excluded instrument(s) is the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic. The
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic takes into account the usage of cluster-robust standard errors.
†County FE (fixed effects) are eliminated from the regression models using first-difference
transformation of the regression model, except in the case of Column 1 (pooled OLS estimation).
††Control variables include eight variables for race and Hispanic origin, share of males, three variables
for the population distribution by age, population density, share of small firms.
§The Hausman test and the Hansen J test are used to test the exogeneity of the health insurance
premiums and the validity of the over-identifying restrictions, respectively. Under the null hypothesis of
the Hausman test, the premiums are exogenous. Under the null hypothesis of the Hansen J test, the
over-identifying restrictions are valid.
Second-stage FDIV estimates for the effect of the health insurance premiums on wages
are reported in column 3 and column 4 of Table 6 while the corresponding first-stage FDIV
estimates are reported in column 1 and column 2 of Table 4, respectively. In the case of column
3 of Table 6, we exclusively use per capita medical malpractice payments to instrument for
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the health insurance premiums. In the case of column 4 of Table 6, we use the full set of
instrumental variables for the health insurance premiums. The second-stage coefficients on the
health insurance premiums using instrumental variables methods are more negative than the
corresponding FD coefficient reported in column 2 of Table 6. The difference between the FD
and FDIV estimates may be explained by measurement errors in the health insurance premiums
or by reverse causality bias. The latter endogeneity problem may arise for the following reason:
Increases in (local) wages are likely to increase health care spending (see, e.g., Acemoglu et
al. (2013)) and the health insurance premiums. As shown in columns 3-4 of Table 6, we find
that the second-stage coefficient on the health insurance premiums is statistically insignificant
at the 5% significance level. This result is at least partially caused by the large standard error
associated to the coefficient on the health insurance premiums. Finally, in the case that we
use the full set of instruments (see column 4), we find that the over-identifying restrictions are
not rejected at the 5% significance level (Hansen test’s p-value=0.489). This indicates that the
instrumental variables are likely to be exogenous.
The empirical results for the effects of the health insurance premiums on the employment
rate and wages are consistent with the predictions of a model in which workers do not fully
value the health insurance benefit provided by the employer (see Section 2.1). Variation in
medical malpractice payments and variation in medical malpractice legislation within states
and over time do not increase the quantity or quality of the health insurance benefit provided
by the employer, but changes the price of the health care provided by the employer (see Section
5.2). Consequently, changes in the health insurance premiums, which are driven by variation in
medical malpractice payments or variation in medical malpractice legislation, will not be fully
valued by workers.
6.2 The Causal Effect of the Health Insurance Premiums on Private Health
Insurance Coverage
Since employers are not obliged to offer health insurance coverage to their employees in the
period 2005-2010, we also investigate whether increases in the health insurance premiums im-
ply a decrease of private health insurance coverage. As shown in column 1 of Table 7, the
OLS estimate suggests that premiums are uncorrelated to the private health insurance coverage.
However, the OLS estimate reported in column 1 of Table 7 is unreliable, since we have found
evidence that time-invariant county characteristics are correlated with the explanatory variables
and private health insurance coverage.14
In the case that we additionally control for time-invariant county characteristics (see column
2 of Table 7), we find that increases in the cost of health insurance imply a statistically in-
significant decrease of private health insurance coverage. The previous result may be explained
based on the following line of reasoning. Employer contributions and employee contributions
for employer-sponsored health insurance are not subjected to taxation in the US (see Gruber
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(2011)). On the other hand, costs for nongroup health insurance are subjected to taxation in
the US. Consequently, employees and employers may agree on a compensation package which
includes employer-sponsored health insurance coverage, even when premiums are rising.
Table 7: The Effects of the Health Insurance Premiums on Private Health Insurance Cover-
age – OLS, FD and Second-stage FDIV Estimates Using Two Sets of Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FD FDIV (second-
stage)
FDIV (second-
stage)
(second-stage) (second-stage)
Dependent variable: private health insurance
coverage
HI Premium (in 1000 $) 0.0202 -0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0048
(0.0364) (0.0052) (0.0217) (0.0201)
Observations 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366
Adjusted R-squared 0.437 0.049 - -
Year fixed effects? YES YES YES YES
County fixed effects?† NO YES YES YES
Controls?†† ALL ALL ALL ALL
Additional tests for FDIV estimations
F-statistic on excluded
instrument(s)‡
- - 7.966 21.485
Hausman test’s p-value§ - - 0.987 0.686
Hansen J test’s p-value§ - - - 0.660
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Clustered (and robust) standard errors at the state level are
reported in parenthesis. The outcome variable is private (nonelderly) health insurance coverage. Year FE
(fixed effects) are included in the regression model. The second-stage (FDIV) estimates are computed
using the StataTM command “ivreg2, cluster(state identifier)” using the model in first differences.
‡The F-statistic on the excluded instrument(s) is the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic. The
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic takes into account the usage of cluster-robust standard errors.
†County FE (fixed effects) are eliminated from the regression models using first-difference
transformation of the regression model, except in the case of Column 1 (pooled OLS estimation).
††Control variables include eight variables for race and Hispanic origin, share of males, three variables
for the population distribution by age, population density, share of small firms.
§The Hausman test and the Hansen J test are used to test the exogeneity of the health insurance
premiums and the validity of the over-identifying restrictions, respectively. Under the null hypothesis of
the Hausman test, the premiums are exogenous. Under the null hypothesis of the Hansen J test, the
over-identifying restrictions are valid.
We also analyzed the effect of the health insurance premiums on private health insurance
coverage using the first-difference instrumental variables (FDIV) estimator. The first-stage esti-
mate for the effect of “per capita medical malpractice payments” on the health insurance premi-
ums is reported in column 1 of Table 4, and the first-stage estimates using the full set of IVs are
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reported in column 2 of Table 4. Second-stage estimates are reported in columns 3-4 of Table
7. Using either per capita medical malpractice payments as the only instrumental variable for
the health insurance premiums (see column 3 of Table 7), or using the full set of instrumental
variables for the health insurance premiums (see column 4 of Table 7), we find that the second-
stage coefficient on the health insurance premiums is negative and statistically insignificant.
We also find that the second-stage coefficient on premiums is more negative than the corre-
sponding FD coefficient reported in column 2 of Table 7. The latter finding might be explained
by measurement errors in the heath insurance premiums, which lead to a bias towards zero in
the estimated coefficient on premiums. Finally, it is likely that the instrumental variables are
exogenous, since the over-identifying restrictions are not rejected at the 5% significance level
(Hansen test’s p-value=0.660).
6.3 Robustness Checks
In this section we explore the robustness of our identification strategy. We analyze the rela-
tionship between the predicted health insurance premiums and variables, which should not be
affected by our instruments. More in detail, we estimate eq. (4) using instrumental variables for
the health insurance premiums, and using variables that should not be affected by our instru-
ments (e.g., population density) as the dependent variable in eq. (4). The predicted premiums
on the right-hand side of eq. (4) capture the variation in the instrumental variables that is used
in the IV estimation; lastly, the predicted premiums are obtained by regressing the premiums on
either per capita medical malpractice payments alone (see column 1 of Table 4) or by regressing
the premiums on the full set of instrumental variables (see column 2 of Table 4).
Columns 1-8 of Table 8 demonstrate that the instrument “per capita medical malpractice
payments” is unable to predict variation in the share of males, variables for age distribution
(i.e., share of 15-19 year old persons, share of 20-24 year old persons, share of 65+ year old per-
sons), population density, share of non-Hispanic Whites, share of non-Hispanic Blacks, share of
small firms.16 Since the above-mentioned variables are not statistically significantly affected by
per capita medical malpractice payments, and since these variables could potentially affect the
dependent variables used in this study (e.g., employment rate), it is likely that per capita med-
ical malpractice payments affects the dependent variables only through the health insurance
premiums.
Using the full set of instrumental variables (rather than using exclusively medical malprac-
tice payments) to instrument for the health insurance premiums, we repeated the same tests
16 In unreported regressions, the left-hand side variable for eq. (4) was represented by one of the following
variables: share of Hispanic Whites, share of Hispanic Blacks, share of Hispanic Asians, share of non-
Hispanic Asians, share of Hispanic persons belonging to another race, share of non-Hispanic persons
belonging to another race. The instrument “per capita medical malpractice payments” was unable to
predict variation in any of these dependent variables. These regression results are available from the
author.
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described above. The second-stage estimates are reported in Table 9. Columns 1-8 of Table
9 show that the instrumental variables are unable to predict variation in variables that could
potentially affect the dependent variables used in analysis. Therefore, we think that the instru-
ments reported in Section 5.2 affect the dependent variables only through the health insurance
premiums.
Table 8: Specification Checks – Second-stage FDIV estimates (Medical Malpractice Pay-
ments as the Unique Instrumental Variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV
Dependent variables
Male Age (15-19) Age (20-24) Age (65+) Population White Black Small firms
density (Non-Hispanic) (Non-Hispanic)
HI Premium (in 1,000 $) -0.002 -0.00007 -0.002 0.002 -14.664 -0.0003 0.004 -0.0002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (17.615) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366
Year fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County fixed effects?† YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls?†† ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Clustered (and robust) standard errors at the state level are reported in
parenthesis. Year FE (fixed effects) are included in the regression model. The second-stage (FDIV) estimates are computed
using the StataTM command “ivreg2, cluster(state identifier)” using the model in first differences.
†County effects are eliminated from the regression models using first-difference transformation of the regression model.
††Control variables include eight variables for race and Hispanic origin, share of males, three variables for the population
distribution by age, population density, share of small firms, excluding the dependent variable.
Table 9: Specification Checks – Second-stage FDIV estimates (Full Set of Instrumental
Variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV FDIV
Dependent variables
Male Age (15-19) Age (20-24) Age (65+) Population White Black Small firms
density (Non-Hispanic) (Non-Hispanic)
HI Premium (in 1,000 $) -0.002 -0.0003 -0.002 0.002 -13.475 -0.0002 0.003 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (16.154) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366
Year fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County fixed effects?† YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls?†† ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Clustered (and robust) standard errors at the state level are reported in
parenthesis. Year FE (fixed effects) are included in the regression model. The second-stage (FDIV) estimates are computed
using the StataTM command “ivreg2, cluster(state identifier)” using the model in first differences.
†County effects are eliminated from the regression models using first-difference transformation of the regression model.
††Control variables include eight variables for race and Hispanic origin, share of males, three variables for the population
distribution by age, population density, share of small firms, excluding the dependent variable.
7 The Heterogeneous Effects of the Health Insurance Premiums on Employ-
ment and Wages
In this section we analyze whether the relationship between the health insurance premiums and
the labor market outcomes depends on the private heath insurance coverage. That is, we ana-
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lyze whether the private heath insurance coverage is a moderator for the relationship between
the health insurance premiums and the labor market outcomes used in analysis. We implement
this analysis based on the following reasoning. Since we hypothesized that increases in the
health insurance premiums may negatively affect the labor market outcomes via the increased
employer’s expenditure on the health insurance benefit (see Section 2.1), increases in the cost
of health insurance may imply stronger negative effects on the labor market outcomes in coun-
ties with high private health insurance coverage (compared to counties with low private health
insurance coverage).
In order to analyze whether the private heath insurance coverage acts as a moderator for the
relationship between the health insurance premiums and the labor market outcomes, we interact
the health insurance premiums with (county-level) private health insurance coverage, and we
use the following panel data regression model in first differences:
∆yct = β1∆premiumsst +β2∆coveragect +β3∆(premiumsst ∗coveragect)+∆controls>ctβ2 +∆Tt +∆ct,
(7)
where yct represents either the employment rate or annual wages; where coveragect represents
the county-level private health insurance coverage; and where (premiumsst ∗ coveragect) rep-
resents the interaction between the health insurance premiums and private health insurance
coverage. See Section 5.1 for the description of the remaining terms included in eq. (7). Below,
we will report and discuss estimates from the FD (first difference) estimator for the regression
model (7). As in previous sections, we use robust-cluster standard errors, and the standard
errors are clustered at the state level.17
Since both the health insurance premiums and the private health insurance coverage as well
as their interaction may be endogenous with respect to the error term on the labor market out-
comes, we also use (static) GMM (generalized method of moments) estimation in order to
estimate the parameters included in eq. (7). In the case of GMM estimation, we combine the
external instruments reported in Section 5.2 and “internal instruments” in the same instrument
set; the internal instruments are represented by the second, third, fourth and fifth lags of the
three endogenous variables.18 We use two-step GMM estimation and we use robust-cluster
standard errors for GMM regressions, where the standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The validity of the internal instruments relies on the assumption of serial uncorrelatedness of
the error term in levels (ct). In order to provide evidence that the aforementioned assumption
17 For the sake of completeness, in the following regression tables we will also report estimates from
the pooled OLS regression model (3) including premiums, private health insurance coverage and their
interaction as the main explanatory variables. However, we will not discuss pooled OLS estimates, since
we have found evidence that time-invariant county characteristics are correlated with the explanatory
variables and the employment rate (or annual wages).
18 We also estimated the regression model (7), using the three external instrumental variables reported
in Section 5.2 and excluding the internal instruments from our instrument set -i.e., we used the FDIV
estimator that was already presented in Section 6. The estimates from the (standard) FDIV estimator are
not discussed below, since we have found that these estimates suffer from weak (joint) instrumentation.
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is satisfied for our GMM regression models, in the following discussion we report and discuss
results from Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation of the error term (see Arellano and Bond
(1991) for more details about these tests).19
Empirical Estimates for the Employment Rate
The results from FD and GMM estimations for the effect of premiums, private health insurance
coverage and their interaction on the employment rate are reported in columns 2-3 of Table 10,
respectively. It is worthwhile noting that the interaction term is statistically significant at the 5%
significance level for the regressions reported in columns 2-3 of Table 10. This result implies
that, regardless of the econometric specification, private health insurance coverage appears to
be a moderator for the relationship between the health insurance premiums and the employment
rate.
In the case that we control for county fixed effects via the first-difference transformation
of the regression model (see column 2 of Table 10), we find that the coefficient on the health
insurance premiums is statistically insignificant while the coefficient on the interaction term
is significant at the 5% level. Since private health insurance coverage is always larger than
zero for all counties, and since the coefficient on premiums is not statistically different from
zero, the total effect of increases in the health insurance premiums on the employment rate is
negative for all counties. Setting the coefficient on premiums equal to zero, we find that a 10%
increase in premiums leads to a 0.7 percentage points and 0.9 percentage points decrease of the
employment rate for the county at 25th percentile and 75th percentile of private health insurance
coverage, respectively.20
Using GMM estimation, we find that the coefficient on the health insurance premiums is
statistically insignificant and the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant at
the 5% significance level (see column 3 of Table 10). Comparing the estimates from the FD
and GMM estimations, we find evidence that the coefficients on premiums and the interaction
term are downward biased for the FD estimator. This result is in line with the findings reported
in Section 6.1. Setting the coefficient on premiums exactly equal to zero, we find that a 10%
increase in premiums leads to a 1.8 percentage points and 2.4 percentage points decrease of
the employment rate for the county at 25th percentile and 75th percentile of private health
insurance coverage, respectively.21 Since the health insurance premiums expressed in real terms
19 Two-step GMM estimates are obtained using the “xtabond2, cluster(state identifier) noleveleq twostep”
command in Stata 13TM. The output of the “xtabond2” command also includes tests results for the
Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation of the error term.
20 The 25th percentile of private health insurance coverage is equal to 0.545 while the 75th percentile
of private health insurance coverage is equal to 0.706. Since the average of the health insurance
premiums is 4.040, we obtain the following estimates: (0.404)*(-0.032)*(0.545)=-0.007; (0.404)*(-
0.032)*(0.706)=-0.009.
21 The 25th percentile of private health insurance coverage is 0.545 while the 75th percentile of private
health insurance coverage is 0.706. Since the average of the health insurance premiums is 4.040, we
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increased by 11.1% in the period 2005-2010 (see Section 6.1), rising premiums decreased the
employment rate by approximately 2 percentage points and 2.6 percentage points for the county
at 25th percentile and 75th percentile of private health insurance coverage during 2005-2010,
respectively.
The GMM estimation passes a series of specification tests. First, we find that the over-
identifying restrictions are not rejected at the 5% level (Hansen test’s p-value=0.375). Second,
we find that the error term in levels (ct) is uncorrelated with its first, second and third lags at
the 5% significance level (see the results of the m2, m3 and m4 tests in Table 10, respectively),22
indicating that internal instruments are very likely to be valid. To conclude, in line with our
theoretical discussion, we find strong evidence that private health insurance coverage acts as a
moderator for the relation between the health insurance premiums and the employment rate.
Table 10: The Moderating Effect of the Private Health Insurance Coverage on the Relation-
ship between the Health Insurance Premiums and the Labor Market Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FD GMM OLS FD GMM
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
employment rate annual wages
HI premium (in 1000 $) 0.175** 0.012* 0.022 4,358.716* -55.780 258.589
(0.068) (0.007) (0.021) (2,460.614) (224.669) (505.232)
Private HI coverage 1.624*** 0.175*** 0.264** 20,193.930 1,730.920 8,573.110**
(0.400) (0.051) (0.132) (18,461.358) (1,670.301) (4,264.930)
Interaction (premium*coverage) -0.241*** -0.031** -0.084** -517.736 -179.106 -1,733.887**
(0.088) (0.012) (0.034) (4,387.644) (414.453) (877.124)
Observations 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366 15,366
R-squared 0.249 0.115 - 0.486 0.068 -
Year fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES
County fixed effects? NO YES YES NO YES YES
Controls? ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL
Additional tests for GMM estimations
Hansen J test’s p-value§ - - 0.375 - - 0.437
Arellano-Bond m2 p-value§§ - - 0.306 - - 0.131
Arellano-Bond m3 p-value§§ - - 0.592 - - 0.593
Arellano-Bond m4 p-value§§ - - 0.182 - - 0.144
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Clustered (and robust) standard errors at the state level are reported in
parenthesis. The outcome variable is the employment rate in Columns 1-3, and wages in Columns 4-6. Year FE (fixed
effects) are included in the regression model. The second-stage GMM estimates are computed using the StataTM command
“xtabond2, cluster(state identifier) twostep noleveleq”.
§The Hansen J test is used to test the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis of the Hansen J
test, the over-identifying restrictions are valid.
§§Under the null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond’s m2 test, the error term in levels (ct) is uncorrelated with its lag (c,t−1).
Under the null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond’s m3 test, the error term in levels (ct) is uncorrelated with its second-order
lag (c,t−2). Under the null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond’s m4 test, the error term in levels (ct) is uncorrelated with its
third-order lag (c,t−3). See Arellano and Bond (1991) for more details about the m2, m3 and m4 tests.
obtain the following estimates: (0.404)*(-0.084)*(0.545)= -0.018; (0.404)*(-0.084)*(0.706)=-0.024.
22 For more details about the null hypothesis of the m2, m3 and m4 tests, see the notes at the bottom of
Table 10.
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Empirical Estimates for Annual Wages
The results from FD and GMM estimations for the effects of premiums, private health insur-
ance coverage and their interaction on annual wages are reported in columns 5-6 of Table 10,
respectively. In line with the theoretical discussion reported above, we find that the coefficient
on the interaction term is always negative for the regressions reported in columns 5-6; however,
the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant at the 5% significance level only
in the case of the GMM estimation. Since the health insurance premiums and the interaction
term are statistically insignificant in the case of the FD estimation (see column 5), we focus our
discussion on the results from GMM estimation.
The GMM estimation passes two specification tests. We find that the over-identifying re-
strictions are not rejected at the 5% significance level (Hansen test’s p-value=0.437), suggesting
that both the external and internal instrumental variables are exogenous. We also find that the
error term in levels (ct) is uncorrelated with its first, second and third lags at the 5% signifi-
cance level (see the results of the m2, m3 and m4 tests in Table 10). The latter result suggests
that the internal instrumental variables are very likely to be exogenous.
The second-stage GMM estimate for the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and
significant at the 5% significance level, indicating that the effect of increases in the health insur-
ance premiums on wages varies depending on private health insurance coverage. On the other
hand, we find that the coefficient on the health insurance premiums is statistically insignificant.
Based on the estimates reported in column 6 and setting the coefficient on the health insurance
premiums exactly equal to zero, we find that a 10% increase in premiums –i.e., a 404$ increase
in premiums– decreases annual wages by 382$ and 495$ for the county at 25th percentile and
75th percentile of private health insurance coverage, respectively.23 These estimates imply that
increases in premiums are “fully shifted” onto wages only in the case of counties with high
private health insurance coverage while increases in premiums are less than fully shifted onto
wages in the case of counties with low private health insurance coverage. Since the health in-
surance premiums increased by 11.1% in real terms during 2005-2010 (see Section 6.1), rising
premiums decreased annual wages by slightly more than 500 US dollars for the county at the
75th percentile of private health insurance coverage.
Finally, it is worth noting that if we repeat the above calculations including the direct ef-
fect of the health insurance premiums on annual wages,24 we find evidence that increases in
premiums are less than fully shifted onto wages for both the county at the 25th percentile and
75th percentile of private health insurance coverage. In conclusion, our empirical results con-
23 I.e., these estimates are obtained using the following formulas: (0.404)*(-1733.887)*(0.545)=-381.767;
(0.404)*(-1733.887)*(0.706)=-494.546.
24 I.e., we calculate the effect of the health insurance premiums on wages as [(βpremium×0.404)+(βinteraction×
private coverage × 0.404], where βpremium is the estimated coefficient on premiums; βinteraction is the
estimated coefficient on the interaction term; (private coverage) denotes the private health insurance
coverage. Finally, a 10% increase in premiums is represented by the value 0.404.
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firm the conjecture that the private health insurance coverage moderates the effect of the health
insurance premiums on annual wages.
8 Conclusion
This study analyzes the effects of increases in employer-sponsored health insurance premiums
on employment and annual wages in the US for the period 2005-2010. Previous studies an-
alyzed the effects of rising health insurance premiums (or rising health care costs) on several
labor market outcomes using repeated cross-sectional (and individual-level) datasets (see Cut-
ler and Madrian (1998); Baicker and Chandra (2006)). In contrast to previous studies, data on
the labor market outcomes used in this study –employment rate and annual wages– vary at the
county-year level and enable to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity which may
be correlated with the labor market outcomes and the health insurance premiums.
In addition to controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we also use instru-
mental variables for the health insurance premiums in order to estimate the causal effects of the
health insurance premiums on employment and wages. Using variation in per capita medical
malpractice payments and variation in medical malpractice legislation as the sources of iden-
tifying variation in the health insurance premiums, we find that a 10% increase in the health
insurance premiums implies a statistically significant 2.2% decrease (1.1 percentage points de-
crease) of the employment rate, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, increases in the cost of
employer-sponsored health insurance imply an insignificant decrease of annual wages. Since
the health insurance premiums increased by 11.1% in real terms between 2005 and 2010, our
results indicate that the increasing cost of health insurance had a strong negative effect on em-
ployment during 2005-2010.
Utilizing estimates of private health insurance coverage as a proxy for employer-sponsored
health insurance coverage, we also analyzed whether private health insurance coverage acts as
a moderating variable in the relationship between the health insurance premiums and the labor
market outcomes used in analysis. Indeed, since increases in the cost of health insurance may
negatively affect employment and wages via the increased cost of the health insurance benefit
provided by the employer, rising premiums may imply stronger negative effects on employment
and wages in counties that are characterized by high private coverage. We find that rising pre-
miums imply a (statistically significantly) stronger negative impact on employment and wages
in counties with high private coverage: The negative effect of rising premiums on the employ-
ment rate and annual wages is approximately 30% larger for the county at the 75th percentile
of private health insurance coverage than for the county at the 25th percentile of private health
insurance coverage.
Our study reaches two main conclusions. First, rising health insurance premiums imply a
negative effect on workers in the form of decreased employment, and this effect is stronger for
counties that display high private health insurance coverage. Second, rising premiums exert
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an additional negative effect on workers in the form of decreased wages in counties that are
characterized by high private health insurance coverage. Since rising health insurance premiums
worsen employment prospects and tend to reduce wages, the US federal and state governments
may consider to use fiscal stimulus in order to counteract the negative effects of rising premiums
on employment and wages.
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A Appendix A
A.1 Structure of the Panel Dataset
Table A1: Panel structure
Year Observations Percentage Cumulative percentage
2006 3079 20.04 20.04
2007 3079 20.04 40.08
2008 3080 20.04 60.12
2009 3080 20.04 80.16
2010 3048 19.84 100.00
All years 15366 100 100
Notes: Since our methodology relies on first-difference estimation, the number of observations
in the year 2005 is zero. See Section 5.1 for more details about the methodology used in this
study.
A.2 The Construction of County-Level Estimates for Private Health Insurance
Coverage
County-level estimates for private nonelderly health insurance coverage are not available from
governmental agencies for the period 2005-2010. Using county-level estimates on total nonelderly
health insurance coverage, and county-level estimates on public nonelderly health insurance
coverage, we computed estimates of private nonelderly health insurance coverage by subtract-
ing the latter variable from the first variable reported above.
A.2.1 Total (Nonelderly) Health Insurance Coverage
County-level estimates for total (nonelderly) health insurance coverage are obtained from the
US Census Bureau’s SAHIE (Small Area Health Insurance Estimates) dataset. The SAHIE
dataset contains estimates for the share of nonelderly (0-64) individuals that are covered by
either private or public health insurance in each US county.25 Data on total health insurance
coverage are available from 2005 onward. For this reason, the initial year included in our
longitudinal dataset is the year 2005. Finally, see Appendix B.3 for additional details on data
sources for total health insurance coverage.
25 Private health insurance coverage can be obtained via the employer or via the nongroup health insurance
market. Public health insurance coverage can be obtained through Medicaid or CHIP (Children’s Health
Insurance Program).
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A.2.2 Public (Nonelderly) Health Insurance Coverage
We use the US Department of Health & Human Services’ AHRF (Area Health Resource File)
dataset to construct county-level estimates of public (nonelderly) health insurance coverage.
The AHRF (Area Health Resource File) dataset contains county-level estimates for the number
of nonelderly individuals that are eligible for public health insurance –i.e., Medicaid or CHIP
(Children’s Health Insurance Program). We divide the latter variable, which varies at the county
level, by county-level estimates of the number of nonelderly (0-64) persons living in each US
county, thus obtaining county-level estimates of public health insurance coverage. Data on
Medicaid/CHIP eligibility from the AHRF dataset are not available after the year 2010. For
this reason, the final year included in our longitudinal dataset is the year 2010. Finally, see
Appendix B.3 for additional details on data sources for public health insurance coverage.
A.3 Summary Statistics for Per-Capita Medical Malpractice Payments
Table A2: Summary Statistics for Per Capita Medical Malpractice Payments
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per-capita medical malpractice payments in US dollars† 15366 10.048 6.358 2.714 45.548
Notes: data on medical malpractice payments are obtained from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services’ NPDB (National Practitioner Data Bank) dataset.
†Medical malpractice payments are expressed in per capita terms, and are expressed in constant 2005 US
dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI inflation calculator.
A.4 Variation in Medical Malpractice Legislation
Table A3: Legal Reform Used in Analysis
Reform Description of the reform Example
Caps on non-
economic
damage awards
Non-economic (pain and suffer-
ing) damage awards payable to
the victim of malpractice are
capped at a statutorily specified
dollar amount.
A cap on non-economic damage
awards was introduced in Georgia
in 2005, limiting non-economic
damage awards to 350,000 $ per
healthcare provider.
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Table A4: List of States that Enacted (or Repealed) Caps on Non-economic Damage
Awards
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 #Changes
Enactments GA AK, IL, SC - - - 4
Repeals - WI - - - 1
Notes: since health insurance contracts are typically finalized 3+ months prior to the calendar year in
which they take effect (see Avraham et al. (2012), p. 13), and since we use data for the health insurance
premiums from 2005 to 2010, the relevant years for identification are changes from 2005 to 2009. Data
source: DSTLR (Database of State Tort Law Reforms), 5th edition, 1980-2012; see Avraham (2014) for
more details.
B Appendix B. Data Sources
B.1 Data Sources and Data Imputation for the Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance Premiums
• Data sources for the employer-sponsored health insurance premiums
County-level data on health insurance premiums are not available from governmental agencies.
We use state-year-level data on health insurance premiums, and the data is obtained from the
MEPS-IC database. More in detail, the data on health insurance premiums used in this study
are obtained from Table II.C.1 of the MEPS-IC database.
The MEPS-IC data can be downloaded at the following link: https://meps.ahrq.gov/
mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables_results.jsp?component=2&subcomponent=2&year=
2005&tableSeries=-1&tableSubSeries=&searchText=&searchMethod=1&Action=Search
The methodology used for data collection is available at the following link: https://
meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/Pub_ProdLookup_Results.jsp?ProductType=
Methodology\%20Report\&Comp=Insurance
• Data imputation for the health insurance premiums
The MEPS-IC dataset does not include data on health insurance premiums for the year 2007.
As in Burtless and Mikusheva (2012), we reconstructed the health insurance premiums in year
2007 as the average of the health insurance premiums in year 2006 and year 2008 by state.
To check whether this imputation technique is valid to approximate the health insurance pre-
miums in 2007, we constructed a synthetic measure for the health insurance premiums (hence-
forth “synthetic premiums”) in year 2009 as the average of the health insurance premiums in
year 2008 and year 2010 (by state), and we have found that the “synthetic premiums” in year
2009 are highly correlated to the real health insurance premiums in 2009 (correlation=0.85).
Thus, it is also likely that the imputed premiums for the year 2007 are highly correlated to the
real (and unknown) premiums for the year 2007.
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B.2 Data Sources for the Labor Market Outcomes
• Data sources for the employment rate
The employment rate at the county level is constructed as the number of employed persons by
county (QCEW dataset) divided by the number of 15-64 year old persons by county (“USA
counties” dataset).
County-level (annual) data on the number of employed persons by county are obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ QCEW (Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages)
dataset. QCEW datasets can be downloaded at the following link: https://www.bls.gov/
cew/datatoc.htm
Data on the number of 15-64 year old persons by county are obtained from the US Census
Bureau’s “USA counties” dataset. The “USA counties” dataset can be downloaded at this link:
http://www.census.gov/support/USACdataDownloads.html.26
• Data sources for annual wages
County-level data on annual wages are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ QCEW
(Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages) dataset. The variable used in analysis is “Annual
average pay”: “Annual average pay” is equal to total annual wages divided by annual average
employment (by county). County-level data can be downloaded at the following link: https:
//www.bls.gov/cew/datatoc.htm
B.3 Data Sources for Private (Nonelderly) Health Insurance Coverage
• Total (Nonelderly) Health Insurance Coverage
SAHIE estimates for the period 2005-2010 can be downloaded at the following link: https://
www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/sahie/estimates-cps.html
• Public (Nonelderly) Health Insurance Coverage
The AHRF data set can be downloaded at http://ahrf.hrsa.gov/download.htm . Data
on the number of nonelderly individuals in each county-year cell are obtained from the SAHIE
dataset; see https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/sahie/estimates-
acs.html
26 See the Excel file “Mastdata.xls” for more information on the county level variables that are included
in the “USA counties” dataset; the aforementioned Excel file can be found at http://www.census.
gov/support/USACdataDownloads.html
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B.4 Data Sources for State-Level Estimates of Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance Coverage
The March CPS (Current Population Survey) datasets contain information on health insurance
coverage of US citizens. The March CPS asks several questions about the types of health insur-
ance coverage that the respondent had during the calendar year prior to interview. Among all
questions on health insurance coverage included in the March CPS, we exclusively selected the
question on employer-sponsored health insurance coverage. Each respondent is asked whether
(or not) the respondent is covered by employer-sponsored health insurance. The dummy vari-
able for employer-sponsored health insurance coverage takes value 1 if the respondent receives
health insurance from her employer, 0 otherwise. In order to compute estimates for employer-
sponsored health insurance coverage at the state-year level, we computed the average of the
above-mentioned dummy variable at the state level, and we repeated this procedure for all
March CPS datasets ranging from March CPS 2006 to March CPS 2011.27
The March CPS datasets are obtained from the CEPR Uniform Extracts of the March CPS.
The datasets and codebooks can be found at the following link: http://ceprdata.org/cps-
uniform-data-extracts/march-cps-supplement/march-cps-data/
B.5 Data Sources for Control Variables Used in Analysis
• Data sources for socio-economic variables
County-level data on socio-economic variables are obtained from the US Census Bureau’s
“USA counties” dataset. The “USA counties” dataset can be downloaded at http://www.
census.gov/support/USACdataDownloads.html
• Data sources for “share of small firms”
The share of small firms is defined as the ratio of number of small firms to total number of
firms, where a firm is defined as a “small firm” if it employs less than 500 employees. Data on
firm size can be downloaded at https://www.sba.gov/advocacy/firm-size-data (see
the “counties excel file” therein).
B.6 Data Sources for the Instrumental Variables
• Data sources for “per capita medical malpractice payments”
27 Due to the retrospective nature of the March CPS, we use the March CPS 2006 to generate estimates of
employer-sponsored health insurance coverage for the year 2005; the same line of reasoning applies to
the remaining March CPS datasets.
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Data on “per capita medical malpractice payments” are obtained from the US Department of
Health & Human Services’ NPDB (National Practitioner Data Bank) dataset. Data on medical
malpractice payments can be downloaded at the following link: http://www.npdb.hrsa.
gov/resources/publicData.jsp
• Data sources for medical malpractice tort reforms
Data on tort legislation at the state-year level are obtained from the DSTLR (Database of State
Tort Law Reforms), fifth edition. See the excel file “Database of State Tort Law Reforms Clever
(5.1)” at the following link: http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/ravraham/dstlr.
html
C Appendix C. Summary Statistics for Total and Public (Nonelderly) Health
Insurance Coverage
Table C1: Summary Statistics for Total and Public Health Insurance Coverage
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total nonelderly health insurance coverage (share)† 15366 0.819 0.059 0.692 0.906
Public nonelderly health insurance coverage (share)†† 15366 0.197 0.094 0.053 0.388
†Total (nonelderly) health insurance coverage is the share of persons that are covered by health insurance in each county.
†Public (nonelderly) health insurance coverage is the share of persons that are covered by public health insurance in each
county. Public health insurance coverage can be obtained through Medicaid or CHIP.
D Appendix D. Malpractice Legislation and the Health Insurance Premiums
Table D1: Variation in Medical Malpractice Legislation and the Health Insurance Premiums
FD estimator
Dependent variable
HI Premium (in 1,000 $)
caps on damagess,t−1 (enactments of caps on damage awards) -0.003
(0.050)
repealss,t−1 (repeals of caps on damage awards) 0.110***
(0.014)
Observations 15,366
Adjusted R-squared 0.376
Year fixed effects? YES
County fixed effects? YES
Controls? ALL
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Clustered (and robust) standard errors at the state level are reported in
parenthesis. The outcome variable is health insurance premiums. Year FE (fixed effects) are included in the regression
model. The regression model is estimated using the StataTM command “reg, cluster(state identifier)” using the model in first
differences.
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